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ABSTRACT

This study indicates several areas in which the contributions of Piaget, Dewey, and Vygotsky appear to substantiate Montessori theory and practice. Historical information concerning the emergence and accessibility of developmental and educational theory is also provided. The work identifies similarities and differences in the theorists' views of the ways in which children learn, ways in which the learning process includes the social environment, and ways in which human beings perceive the world and learn from it. Topics addressed include characteristics of developmental stages, the nature of language acquisition, the construction of the self, the influence of social interaction and experiences with language on cognitive development, and the development of internal thought and consciousness. It is asserted that the Montessori method provides the means for the kind of social and individual growth that enables children to become "the heroes of their own lives," and leads to confident and responsible participation in a democratic culture. Concluding remarks focus on the importance of the concept of the "zone of proximal development" as a sign to teachers of a limit to their knowledge of children, and an admonition to teachers to be more observant and less directing concerning learning activities of the child. (RH)

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A Re-Vision of Montessori: Connections with Dewey, Piaget, and Vygotsky

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A Re-Vision of Montessori: Connections with Dewey, Piaget, and Vygotsky

Charles Dickens has David Copperfield begin his fictional autobiography with the statement: "Whether I shall turn out to be the hero of my own life or whether that station will be held by anybody else, these pages must show." The film version (the one with Ralph Richardson and Lawrence Olivier and others) has Copperfield in seclusion at a hotel on the south coast of England, walking the windy beach, and searching for an answer to that question. His question seems to be whether he has been a fool and has let life take him while he failed to take responsibility for it, or whether he has become an honorable and respectable man. His introspection and retrospection combine in the end and help him to arrive at the conclusion that he really did turn out all right after all. He had, he concludes, conducted himself with as much honor and integrity as could be expected, given his circumstances, the foibles of youth, and human nature. It is not without importance to our purposes here to note that in the motion picture Copperfield was aided in his soul searching by a series of flashbacks, during which a growing understanding of how others saw him helped him in his arrival at self understanding.

Our question, as people who are interested in how young children get their starts in life, is much like Copperfield's, and that is whether we can contribute to (or at least not stand in the way of) the possibilities that children may come to be the

heroes of their own lives. (Montessori, 1967, p. 255) We need not pursue here the other possible ways of expressing that idea in more modern terms such as "self-determination," "integrated personality," etc. What I propose to do instead is to suggest that Montessori theory and the Montessori method offer a greater promise of reaching that goal than any other system of early education and that the work of other theorists who are currently receiving renewed attention substantiates that claim.

We in early childhood education know Comenius, Locke, Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Dewey and Montessori. Lev Vygotsky is less well known, but I believe that he will become better known in the near future. In educational psychology and in developmental theory, his theory of social and environmental development of language, his work in semiotics, and his position that language facilitates thought and cognitive growth often are contrasted with the theories of Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky, who tend to interpret language as a result of cognitive growth, rather than as a causal factor.

In the short space allowed here, I shall suggest several areas in which the contributions of Piaget, Dewey and Vygotsky can be seen in ways that substantiate Montessori theory and practice. Piaget and Vygotsky were both born in 1896, and John Dewey (1859-1952) was known to both men. Vygotsky, who died of tuberculosis in 1934, had become by 1925 the darling of the intellectual community in Moscow, having startled the Russian academic world a year earlier with a lecture in which he took a position against Pavolv's dominating theory of conditioned reflexes and called for a recognition of the elements of man's

conscious behavior (Wertsch, 1985, p. 8). His work became the touchstone of Soviet psychology.

John Dewey, with a group of American scholars, visited the Soviet Union in 1928, during which time he met with a number of Soviet educators in Leningrad and Moscow (Dewey, 1964). He should have heard of Vygotsky, it seems, but his report of the visit and his conclusions contain very few names, perhaps for the purpose of protecting those with whom he met in those early days of the Stalin era. While I have discovered no evidence that Vygotsky knew Dewey's work, it is likely that he did. Dewey's School and Society had been published in Russian and was widely read by Russian scholars even before the Revolution. The question is especially interesting, because Vygotsky and his protegé and disciple, Alexander Luria, were working on educational and psychological theory and seeking a theoretical base for bringing education to the Soviet masses, which were then, as they are now, comprised of multiple ethnic, social and cultural groups. One of Vygotsky's accomplishments was the development of a useful theory of signs and social behavior (Wertsch, 1979, 1981, p. 24), which paralleled and virtually duplicated in many ways the work of George Herbert Mead, Dewey's close friend, colleague and collaborator during their years together at the University of Chicago.

While the Russians in charge of the public schools were much taken with Dewey's philosophy, they were even more interested in the "project method" of William Heard Kilpatrick, Dewey's principal interpreter (some would say misinterpreter) at Teachers College. Pavel Blonsky, one of Vygotsky's senior colleagues,

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worked with Lenin's wife to implement Progressive principles in the schools, but by the early 1930's the demands of practicality in Progressivism came into conflict with the ideological demands of Communism, and Progressivism was repudiated by the Third International in 1931 (Kozulin, 1984, pp. 124ff). Thereafter, Dewey's name was anathema in the Soviet Union. The plot thickens here, because that same Kilpatrick was the man who, in 1914, had almost single-handedly and very successfully smeared Montessori's work, which had just become known in this country (Kilpatrick, 1914, and Rippa, 1988, p. 223, n. 21). So effective was the Progressive attack on Montessori, led by Kilpatrick, that we did not hear about her again until the late 1950's. By that time, Progressivism had run its course, having become watered down to "life adjustment" and the "project method," and Americans, after Sputnik, were becoming preoccupied with competing educationally with the Russians. It was not until the late 1950's that we heard about Montessori again, when Nancy Rambusch revived the movement in the United States and established the Whitby School in Greenwich, Connecticut, for the training of Montessori teachers (Gutek, 1987, p. 239).

With the growing civil rights movement, we became increasingly concerned with any and all systems of early childhood programs, having been sensitized to the need for early experience by the publication in English of Piaget's work and by the work of Joseph McVicker Hunt. Much, if not most, of the effort in early childhood education was directed toward the neo-romantic open classroom movement, but it is instructive to note that two different publishing houses issued new editions of

The Montessori Method in 1964. The Schocken edition includes a lengthy introductory essay by Joseph McVicker Hunt, who cites six reasons to explain why Montessori had been so readily eliminated from the American scene from 1914 on (Montessori, Schocken, 1964, pp. xiv-xviii). The first was an American reluctance to take pre-school children from the arms of their mothers and place them in institutional settings. Secondly, he cites the growing reliance on the belief in fixed and measureable intelligence (p. xv) (It was in the late 1930's that Skeels and Dye virtually proved the malleability of intelligence and the unreliability of IQ scores with regard to environmental experience and were pilloried for having discovered what the academic establishment caustically referred to as the "wandering IQ"). Third, Hunt recalls the belief, then widespread, in predetermined development and recapitulation theory and the growing conviction that early teaching of reading, writing and counting before age eight was a waste of time (p. xv.). Hunt's fourth and fifth points are that there was a commonly held belief that all behavior is externally motivated and that Thorndike's and Watson's work substituted "behavior" for "consciousness." (Recall Vygotsky's efforts to gain recognition of consciousness in psychology in the 1920's). Hunt's sixth point, and I think it is still true with a lot of us, is that teachers were reluctant to relinquish control in classrooms, an issue of growing significance in current efforts to restructure schools.

Hunt turns each of those points around and gives evidence for why our thinking has changed on each of them, and his arguments show how, in the more than two decades since he wrote

that essay, we have seen developments that have made us more receptive to Montessori. Those developments, I believe, help to explain why we have a newly found interest not only in Montessori but in Vygotsky as well. While that interest includes Dewey and Piaget, it is partially the fact that the latter two have been found wanting that we turn to Vygotsky and Montessori. While all are within the "progressive" (in a very broad sense) or "child-centered" tradition, their approaches include both similarities and differences.

These similarities and differences are best illustrated in the approaches that Montessori, Dewey and Vygotsky take toward interpreting the ways that children learn, how the learning process includes the social environment, and how human beings perceive the world and learn from it. One of the recurring criticisms of Dewey's educational theory is that, while he has developed a useful and important concept of education as a social phenomenon, he has failed to give it a firm psychological basis, with the result that, while children learn from social participation, there is -- some say -- no way psychologically or intellectually for the child to "break out" of his environment.

Despite the frequent (and unfounded) claim that the Montessori method fails to provide adequate socialization, I believe that it has provided the means for both social growth and individual growth which leads to confident and responsible participation in a democratic culture. While there is little research to substantiate these assertions, extended observation at the Bennett Park Montessori Center (one of Buffalo's magnet schools) has convinced me that children grow in confidence and

responsibility in that setting. In addition, the school maintains that the traditional achievement gap between advantaged and disadvantaged children, which typically widens as they go through school, widens at a slower rate for the children at Bennett Park. Thus, children leave that school with a self-respect and a respect for others that can only contribute to more mature living. It requires a good deal of observation, for example, for a visitor to determine which of the children are more capable and which ones are less so. And the Montessori children perform as well on city-wide standardized tests as those from other schools (and in some cases better).

The theory and the method account for the differences one observes in the Montessori setting as compared to a more typical school. One is inclined to say that such activities and results can happen in a typical school -- and they can to some extent -- but a closer look at Montessori theory (and practice) provides arguments against such a position. Vygotsky not only confirms such a position, but his theory also may provide an additional defense for Montessori theory.

First, Montessori. I have chosen, as the major source for Montessori, The Absorbent Mind (Montessori, 1967). Like Piaget, Montessori deals with a theory of stage development, but she concerns herself primarily with the early childhood years (3 to 6). Her "sensitive periods" (order, language, touch, etc.) are too well known to repeat here, but she makes the valuable observation that life begins again at 3 (Montessori, 1967, pp. 61-2). These sensitive periods do not create the mind, but rather its organs (language, judgment of distance and finding

one's way about, balancing on the feet, etc. (Montessori, 1967, pp. 51 and 94). Each period lasts long enough to contruct a "psychic organ" (Montessori, 1967, p. 51).

We know that the brain of a two-year-old, for example, burns twice as much energy as that of an adult. (NOVA "Fires in the Mind," April 25, 1988, WNED, Buffalo, television presentation). It is during that period that the child acquires language at a rate that can be matched at no other age. Noam Chomsky argues that we have a physiological language mechanism that makes such accomplishment possible -- that we are, in a sense, "wired for sound." Montessori, on the other hand, while she says that "a special mechanism exists for language" (Montessori, 1967, p. 119), modifies that to suggest that language is "an instrument of collective thought (p. 108), ...a creation superimposed on nature, an intelligent product of the mass mind" (pp. 110-11). At three, the child, in behavior that smacks of such Piagetian terms as "decentering," "object permanence" and "concrete operations", comes alive to objects. While the activity of the infant has been mental, rather than motor, at three, these mental "absorptions" are ready to become actualized. The child, by three, has had a year of language use and vocabulary development and is eager for more.

Up to this point, the child has been "absorbing" experiences and awarenesses from his environment. At three, according to Montessori, it begins a construction of self through conscious interaction with the environment. Vygotsky helps to elaborate on this phenomenon by distinguishing, much like Montessori, the "lower psychological functions" from the "higher functions"

(Vygotsky, 1986, p. xxix, and Luria,1979, p. 45). Like Montessori, he perceives of the operation not so much as a mind developing itself, but as the mind developing multiple tools for survival. He refers to the lower functions as "spontaneous" and to the higher ones as "scientific." The former reflect the spontaneous environmental experiences of the child up to the age of consciousness, while the latter are the conscious experiences that become incorporated in the conscious self.

Vygotsky, like Piaget, followed Pierre Janet in the belief that intrapersonal processes are transformed interpersonal relations. The spontaneous experiences (lower functions) are transformed, through conscious social interation, into intrapersonal relations (consciousness) (Vygotsky, 1986, p. xxvi). They move from gesture-in-itself to gesture-for-others to gesture-for-oneself (for example, seeing the mother smile, smiling back to respond, and recognizing that one is worthy of a smile). "By absorbing what he finds about him," Montessori argues, "he forms his own personality." The child's need is to develop its powers by means of interaction with or "experience on" its environment. "We call such experience 'work'" (Montessori, 1967, p. 25).

Thus, Montessori's aim is to help the child, at three, to grow into concentration, into his/her ability to focus, to become interested, and to choose. The child is not receptive, as we usually think, but active (Montessori, 1967, p. 254.). The mental perceptions of the first three years are now ready to be actualized, and it is physical activity that the child now demands.

begins again at three, is that child's own development of self, which results from its own peculiar perspective (psychologically and physiologically already set) in coming to terms with its world. It must be about the business which only it can do -- it must create itself. The conclusion one must draw from this is that if this is the physiological/psychological nature of young children, then a typical authoritarian approach to education can only result in less growth than the child is capable of achieving.

In looking at the theories of language as they relate to cognitive growth, a pattern emerges -- a progression of acquiring and using information from seeing (the infant) to feeling and touching (the child) to conceptual thinking in the adult. The child, as Jerome Bruner writes in his introduction to the 1962 publication of Vygotsky's Thought and Language, creates "higher order structures that, in effect, replace and give new power to the conceptual structures that one climbed over en route to higher order mastery" (Vygotsky, 1962, p. ix). One is reminded of Piaget's idea of horizontal decalage, in which the child masters only a part of the total concept at a given time (Ginsburg and Opper, 1979, p. 152). This phenomenon in Piagetian theory illustrates the attachment to concrete objects and the lack of logico-deductive thought. Vygotsky does better, I think. He describes the idea of pseudo-concepts or complexes, which serve as bridges to conceptual thought (Vygotsky, 1962, p. ix). The child and the adult may share knowledge of a given word, but the adult's understanding of it includes a rich cultural complex of meaning (which, by the way, may change with time and use), and

the child's understanding may be limited only to one aspect or one meaning or use of the word. Word meanings are not learned spontaneously by the child, but those meanings are clarified through experience in the culture and in conversation with adults (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 66. See also Wertsch, 1985, pp. 105ff). Common use of the word can lead, of course, to the false assumption that the child understands the concept represented by that word (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 66, and Wertsch, 1979, 1981, pp. 105ff). In Vygotsky's own words:

> Verbal intercourse with adults thus becomes a powerful factor in the development of the child's concepts. The transition from thinking in complexes [pseudo-concepts] to thinking in concepts passes unnoticed by the child because his pseudo-concepts already coincide in content with the adult's concepts. Thus the child begins to operate with concepts, to practice conceptual thinking, before he is clearly aware of the nature of these observations. This peculiar genetic situation is not limited to the attainment of concepts; it is the rule rather than an exception in the intellectual development of the child (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 67).

Montessori refers to "explosions" in learning -- explosions into reading and into writing. She appears to be describing points at which pseudo-concepts come together and provide take-off points for growth. While she does not identify the initial discovery of the power of concentration in the three-year-old as an "explosion," I believe that is what occurs when through whatever practical life activities, play activities or stories the child has been read, the child brings together connections that hold his/her attention. Then, through concentration and repetition, the child achieves what Montessori calls normalization. "If you watch a child of three," she says, "you will see that he is always playing with something. This means that he is working it out, and making conscious, something

that his unconscious mind has earlier absorbed" (Montessori, 1967, p. 27).

Significant work has been done over the past fifteen years on the role of private speech and its importance, not only in self-regulation but also as a transitional tool in early childhood in the development of internal thought. The work of Laura Berk and others draws on Vygotsky's work, and their conclusions substantiate the earlier claims made by Montessori regarding the need for self-direction in the learning process. Most significantly, as Berk writes, "internalized verbal thinking originates in the give-and-take of social interaction" (Berk, p. 51). But more than that, individualized learning programs which provide for peer interaction "will encourage task-related verbal and motor behaviors that may enhance learning and achievement" (Berk, p. 49). Private speech, then, rather than serving as an indication of the limiting force of the child's egocentricity (Piaget), becomes a more complex process of gradual movement from external expression to internal thought (Berk, p. 47).

It is obvious that the idea of development as a genetically determined unfolding or maturation was alien to all four of the theorists we are considering here. For Dewey, it was a social process which happened within a social context, but he fails to account for the psychological characteristics of development. Montessori, following Rousseau and Pestalozzi, sees it as an interaction that occurs from within, but within a cultural context; we are human through human interaction, but there is a driving urge in man (horme), which is "the source of evolution" (Montessori, 1967, p. 83). Piaget is concerned with the

development of cognitive processes through the development of intellectual structures as a result of the interaction between the organism and the environment. Human contact is essential, but cultural differences are important; experiments to prove the cross-cultural applications of his theory are well known.

Vygotsky is different. Coming of professional age in revolutionary Russia, he spent the remaining years of his brief life creating, in the ideologically restrictive confines of the early years of the Soviet Union, approaches to psychology, language, culture and education that inspired his successors to call him the father of Soviet psychology. Lest that title raise unwarranted suspicions, it should be noted that Vygotsky was a Jew, a fact no more helpful to his career in Soviet society than it had been in tsarist Russia. His theoretical work began before the Revolution and, while it eventually had to reflect Marxist ideology, that was not the heart of it. Intellectuals worked under Lenin's admonition that they were to develop their theories within a materialistic framework. My reading of Vygotsky tells me that while he did take a kind of materialist approach to the interrelationships among psychology, culture, language and education, the more significant influences on his thought may have been derived from Western intellectual and cultural trends -- pragmatism and gestaltism in psychology, post-impressionism in art, and structuralism in linguistic and literary theory (Vygotsky, 1986, pp. xiiiff). Where he becomes valuable to us here is in his continued concern with that first paper that he presented in Moscow in 1924, in which, arguing against the then-dominant Pavlovian stimulus-response theory, he claimed that

scientific psychology must include consideration of the facts of consciousness (Vygotsky, 1986, p. xvi). He was working at the time on The Psychology of Art (published in Russia only in 1965 and in English translation in 1971) (Vygotsky, 1986, p. xv), in which he developed the theory that "culture and consciousness constituted the actual subject of inquiry, while psychology remained a conceptual tool, important but hardly universal" (Vygotsky, 1986, p. xv). His preoccupation with human functions, rather than natural and behavioral ones, remained central to the remainder of his work (Vygotsky, 1986, p. xv).

Vygotsky and Alexander Luria worked together on problems in language and speech, and two of their projects are particulary relevant here in this defense of Montessori theory and method. The first substantiates Montessori's and Piaget's belief in the physiological influence of development on the intellectual processes in the early years. The second serves to uphold the claim of the importance of culture in the development of cognitive processes. Luria, basing his experiment on his and Vygotsky's findings in the mid-1920's in which they explored "ways in which language could be used to reorganize the mental processes of patients suffering from neurological disorders" (Luria, 1979, p. 104), carried out experiments after World War II with young children in an effort to ascertain how they used language as a tool in cognitive development. Children of 2 to 2 1/2, in a laboratory situation in which actions were not meaningful to them, exhibited inertia of both motor and verbal functions in response to arbitrary verbal instructions. Children of 3 to 3 1/2 became significantly more plastic in their motor

functions and flexible in their verbal functions, but their verbal and motor functions were often contradictory. Within a few months, verbal and motor responses tended to be coordinated (Luria, 1979, pp. 112-13).

Vygotsky and Luria, together, had traveled to Central Asia in the early 1930's to do a series of experiments with primitive peoples, and they discovered, much as Basil Bernstein did with the East London working class populations in the 1960's, that restricted cultural experience led to restricted sociolinguistic development (Luria, 1979, chapter 4). With experience and training, those people interviewed by Luria and Vygotsky changed. Luria concludes:

> When our subjects had acquired some education and had participated in collective discussions of vital social issues, they readily made the transition to abstract thinking. New experiences and new ideas change the way people use language so that words become the principal agent of abstraction and generalization. Once people are educated, they make increasingly greater use of categorization to express ideas about reality (Luria, 1979, p. 73).

Vygotsky spent the brief years of his professional life in trying to broaden Russian psychology from a behavioral mode to one which included the facts of consciousness. The two experiments described above illustrate both the developmental and cultural influences in psycholinguistic development. It is that process with which he deals in the idea of the "zone of proximal development," the concept for which he is only now becoming

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known among educators. He writes, in Thought and Language, "In perception, in thinking, in acting, the child tends to merge the most diverse elements into an unarticulated image on the strength of some chance impression" (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 110). He cites Claparéde's term, "syncretism," which was used by Piaget to describe the phenomenon, and he mentions his Russian colleague, Blonsky, who called it "incoherent coherence." And he continues:

> Many words, therefore, have in part the same meaning for the child and to the adult, especially words referring to concrete objects in the child's habitual surroundings. The child's and the adult's meanings of a word often 'meet,' as it were, in the same concrete object, and this suffices to ensure mutual understanding (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 110).

It is the meeting of the child and adult minds that concerns us here. He referred to that point as the "zone of proximal development," which he defined as:

> the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult supervision or in collaboration with more capable peers (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 111, and Wertsch, 1984, p. 8).

Vygotsky defines intelligence as the individual's potential for further learning. That topic will have to wait for discussion on another occasion, but I would like to begin to close in on some correlations between Vygotsky and Montessori. I am reminded here of the story told to me of a Montessori parent whose child, because of "learning disabilities," did not learn to read until age nine. The child was never "held back" or removed from her peer group -- there was no need to do so because of the nature of the Montessori program -- and by age fifteen she was a happy and productive child and successful student. The point that

this example illustrates is that we know too little about how to define or pinpoint a child's "zone of proximal development." That is a rich and potentially useful concept, but my fear is that educators, rather than recognizing that it is useful in telling us what we cannot know about (and therefore cannot do to) children, may delude themselves into thinking that their job is to discover each child's ZPD or "zoped" and to use that knowledge to more successfully impose on children "what they need to know."

The idea could lead to disaster. But if used in the Rousselian, Pestalozzian, Montessorian tradition, it can be tremendously freeing and assuring -- if we cannot know exactly where the ZPD lies, we can feel more confident in our efforts, as Montessori would have us do, to be more observant and less directing in the learning activities of the child. In the example cited above, the Montessori method allowed for the developmental processes to catch up and, at the same time, for the teachers to keep hands off so that no psychosocial damage was done with negative messages such as failing grades or grade retention. On the other hand, a five- or six-year-old invited me one day to watch him do his math work, which involved manipulations of numbered tiles to further the concepts of ones, tens, hundreds, and thousands. When a column goes beyond ten, ten tiles are taken from that column, and a single tile of ten times that value is added to the next. The aim of the lesson is obvious. But something happened which illustrates the validity of the Montessori theory and materials. In this particular "work," one can imagine how many tiles are moved around the table. This child (whether to save time and effort or just for

the visual, tactile, physical or aesthetic pleasure, I do not know) used both hands simultaneously to move tiles in groups -- but always in sets -- sets of three, sets of four, sets of two -- but always in sets. If a teacher had been supervising and directing the work, the child might not have gained those insights into set theory at so early an age. I should add, as a footnote, that upon completion of the work, he collected the materials and returned them to the appropriate shelf. But less than an hour later, he took the same work from the shelf and began all over again.

I watched one day, in a 3 to 5 class, as a girl did a similar project which involved placing numbered tiles in numbered squares and writing the numbers on a corresponding sheet of blank squares. She worked with keen interest and concentration for more than an hour. I recall the early days of "Sesame Street," when a professor of open education theory at my graduate school told us with great enthusiasm that the people at "Sesame Street" had learned that the typical attention span of a typical child who would watch that program was approximately twenty seconds, and that their segments were planned accordingly. We were imbued with the wonders of Piagetian theory in those days, and we have only recently come to realize that Piagetian theory is more useful in making us respectful of the child than in designing materials for classrooms. And now we have the wonders of the Zone of Proximal Development to worry about.

In the meantime, Montessori goes on. Some would make that a damning comment and say that the theory and method developed by Montessori are outdated and have not changed with the times.

(Shades of William H. Kilpatrick!) After several years of reading Montessori and about Montessori and comparing everything else I have read and done with Montessori, both in theory and in practice, I am continually struck by the realization that she "got there first with the most." She knew then that she did not know what we do not yet know. And she developed materials which have stood the test of time and child interest, and these have been added to by others. Montessori is not static -- her contribution is really a frame of mind -- but I think that she would recognize the schools that now carry her name. She would quickly see that the culture has changed. But she would recognize the important continuities -- the nature of the child and the respect for that nature, the promotion of concentration, and the commitment to non-interference in the earning process. The materials, which often have been criticized as having promoted regimentation and non-creativity are simply the physical vehicles designed to promote the freedom that leads to the confidence and self-control needed by the children in order to become active and creative beings -- to become the heroes of their own lives.

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